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Abstract 
Despite advances in contemporary research on the European administrative space (EAS), no 
widespread understanding about its meaning, mechanisms and significance yet exists. This 
research agenda paper offers a comprehensive conceptualisation of EAS and takes stock of 
accumulated lessons learned. It is suggested that the rise of EAS features a transformation of 
administrative order that analytically can be grasped in terms of four analytical dimensions:  
independence, integration, co-optation and institutionalisation. Taken together, these 
elements suggest that EAS features the transformation of the inherent administrative order 
and the rise of an emergent common administrative system. The purpose of this research 
agenda paper essay is three-folded. Our first ambition is conceptual by offering a new 
account of EAS. The second ambition is empirical examining the varied and rich research 
agendas currently under way. Our final ambition is to stimulate further research along the 
conceptual map suggested. The empirical laboratory consists of key institutions of EAS, 
notably the European Commission, the European Parliament administration, EU agencies, EU 
committees, and domestic agencies. 
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Introduction1 
Despite advances in contemporary research on the European administrative space (EAS), no 
widespread understanding about its meaning, mechanisms and significance yet exists. This 
research agenda paper offers a comprehensive conceptualisation of EAS and takes stock of 
accumulated empirical lessons learned from its development. It is suggested that the rise of 
EAS features a transformation of administrative order that analytically can be grasped in 
terms of four analytical dimensions:  independence, integration, co-optation and 
institutionalisation. The paper suggests that these dimensions envisage the transformation 
of administrative order and the rise of an emergent common administrative system. As seen 
from this stock-taking exercise, these dimensions are reflected in contemporary research on 
EAS.  
 
First, EAS necessitates the rise of independent administrative capacity at a European level, 
notably the rise of relatively permanent and separate institutions - organised according to 
principles of organisation that cross-cut domestic government institutions - that are able to 
act relatively independently from member-state governments. Secondly, the rise of EAS 
requires some degree of integration of this independent European administrative capacity. 
This entails both the inter-institutional integration of administrative structures at European 
Union (EU) level and the intra-institutional integration of each institution thus reinforcing 
internal administrative hierarchies. Third, EAS entails that this independent and integrated 
European administrative capacity is able to co-opt administrative sub-centres by stealth. 
That is, there is a mutual process of integration (‘engrenage’) of domestic agencies and 
relevant EU administrative structures. Moreover, EU institutions may also co-opt other 
international bureaucracies thus integrating global administrative architectures. Fourth, the 
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rise of a common administrative space involves not only structural relationships among 
institutions but also the institutionalisation of shared values and procedures among the 
actors involved. Those common values may be more important in defining the 
administrative space than are more formal elements of governance and administration.  
 
The purpose of this research agenda paper is three-folded. Our first ambition is conceptual 
by offering a new account of EAS. The second ambition is empirical examining the varied and 
rich research agendas currently under way. Our final ambition is to stimulate further 
research along the conceptual map suggested. The reader should notice that there is a 
deliberate bias in this agenda paper towards recent literature. In doing this the paper 
furthermore responds to calls for studying unsettled administrative spaces that are 
continuously evolving. The EU has been pictured as ‘an institutional building site’ (Olsen 
2010: 81). Evolving administrative spaces are important to understand because such systems 
‘are especially likely to call attention to phenomena and mechanisms that are not easily 
observed in well-entrenched, stable polities’ (Olsen 2010: 12). The unsettled nature of EAS 
may be further accentuated by the present European crisis. During periods of stress and 
uncertainty, as the one witnessed in Europe at present,  existing balances in EAS as regards 
institutional independence, integration, co-optation and institutionalisation may change. 
 
This stock taking exercise proceeds as follows: The next section reviews the main lessons 
learned as regards the rise of EAS in recent literature. This section is sequenced in two steps. 
First, a conceptual discussion suggests that we have seen two generations of study on EAS. 
This paper draws attention to the second generation of research where EAS features order 
transformation and administrative centre formation. The second step of the paper offers an 
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empirical re-examination of research as regards institutional independence, integration, co-
optation and institutionalisation of EAS. The empirical laboratories covered by this review 
essay are limited. Certain institutions are excluded, such as the Union Council Secretariat, 
the administration of the European Court of Justice, the administration of the European 
Central Bank, and probably many others. The main focus of this analysis is set on a limited 
set of key institutions of EAS, notably the European Commission (Commission), the European 
Parliament (EP) administration, EU agencies, EU committees, and domestic agencies.    
 
Lessons learned 
Not surprisingly, recent scholarship has diverse understandings of EAS. Questions have 
centred on what such a space contains, whether there are one or several spaces, what has 
caused its emergence, and what implications such space(s) may have for domestic 
government institutions and processes (see Heidbreder 2009). We have seen basically two 
generations of study of EAS. This paper draws attention to the second generation of 
research. 
 The first wave of research emphasised convergence of administrative systems and 
policies. EAS featured the convergence of administrative systems around some 
shared forms. One early contribution to this strand of research defined EAS as 
European administrative convergence, or the ‘convergence on a common European 
model’ (Olsen 2003: 506). Following Olsen, Hofmann and Turk (2006) and Hofmann 
(2008) conceive of EAS as the emergence of a multilevel and nested network-
administration where institutions at different levels of government ‘are linked 
together in the performance of tasks…’ (Hofmann and Turk 2006: 583). Following this 
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strand of research, Amoretti and Musilla (2011) show how e-government tools create 
shared and integrated digital administrative architectures across levels in Europe. 
  A second and more recent line of research conceive of EAS as featuring an emergent 
common administrative order of Europe through the development of new 
institutional constellations and configurations. This order profoundly alters the 
institutional relationships between one administrative centre (basically the 
Commission) and administrative sub-centres (basically EU agencies and domestic 
agencies) (see Egeberg 2006). The ambition of this second generation of scholarship 
is to answer two basic questions: The first general question is how and why common 
administrative order may emerge that profoundly challenges pre-existing 
administrative orders. The second ambition is to answer the following question: 
Given that a common administrative order is emerging, to what extent and under 
what conditions does it profoundly transform pre-existing administrative orders? 
Along this line of scholarship, research has been preoccupied with understanding the 
interconnected nature of the European executive branch of government both in 
agenda setting and implementation processes (e.g. Curtin and Egeberg 2008; Egeberg 
2010; Egeberg and Trondal 2009). A recent strand of research has seen EAS as 
centred on institutional capacity building at EU level, for example in the development 
of EU agencies (e.g. Rittberger and Vonka 2011), the enhanced executive capacities 
of the Commission (e.g. Egeberg 2006), and the varied role of  EU committees (e.g. 
Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011).  
 
Following the second generation of EAS research, this paper suggests that EAS may be 
conceived as featuring administrative order formation that consists of a compound – thus 
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differentiated - and accumulated set of institutions, decision-making processes, behavioural 
patterns, and values (Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2010). Compound administrative spaces more 
generally are typically characterised by the co-existence of multiple and co-evolving 
institutions, decision-making dynamics and accountability practices. In compound 
administrative spaces, decision-making dynamics are likely to co-exist but the mix may 
change over time as well as between different institutional contexts (Olsen 2010). Thus, the 
nuts and bolts of EAS are ultimately determined by how trade-offs between decision-making 
and accountability dynamics are handled by actors in everyday decision making processes as 
well as in periods of institutional creation, reformation and dismantling (Wilson 1989: 327). 
Then, how can one recognise the compound nature of EAS and its role in order formation? 
The following four sub-sections explore four elements of EAS as regards institutional 
independence, integration, co-optation and institutionalisation.  
 
Independence 
First, EAS necessitates the rise of an independent administrative capacity at a European level, 
notably the rise of relatively permanent and separate institutions - organised according to 
principles of organisation that cross-cut domestic government institutions - that are able to 
act relatively independent from member-state governments. The rise of great powers 
through history has more often than not been associated with the growth of independent 
power capacities (Kennedy 1989). This section shows how the growth of administrative 
capacities not only within the Commission but also in institutions outside the Commission 
may contribute to strengthening the independent capacities of the Commission to act. This 
section suggests that institutions outside the Commission in practice tend do supply the 
Commission with relevant organisational capacities - and thus facilitate the formation of 
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EAS. In addition to in-house organisational capacities the Commission is supplied with the 
auxiliary capacities composed of expert committees (ECs), EU agencies, and the EP 
administration. Moreover, the studies reported below suggest that the supply of 
independent organisational capacities of EAS contributes to certain behavioural dynamics 
among the personnel, ultimately forging institutional independence. 
 
The rise of common political order necessitates the rise of independent administrative 
resources and capacity. Envisaged already by Saint-Simon in 1814 (1964: 35-38), one 
necessary factor in building common political order is the establishment of common 
institutions, including a permanent congress independent of national governments serving 
the common interest. In a European context it necessitates the rise of separate institutions 
that are able to act relatively independent from member-state governments. Jean Monnet 
early intended to create a small but indeed independent Commission hired on secondment 
contracts and intentionally not exceeding 200 officials. The present Commission houses 
around 35,000 officials, where most officials are hired on permanent posts for life. Of this 
workforce, only officials engaged in policy-making functions (ADs) are emphasised here. 
Divided by the number of DGs in the Commission, there are on average approximately 300 
ADs per DG (Statistical Bulletin of Commission Staff 01/2011). The most recent expansion of 
the EU administration, however, is found at the level below the Commission, most notably 
among EU agencies (totalling 43 at present (2012)). These also include financial supervisory 
bodies set up as a response to the recent financial crisis in Europe, and the European 
Institute of Innovation and Technology as EU’s new capacity for reinforcing innovation 
capacity.  
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Studies suggest that the organisational capacity built up inside the Commission in practice 
tends to safeguard its autonomy vis-à-vis member-state governments. Yet, a long-held myth 
has lingered that nationality affects the internal functioning of the Commission. As claimed 
by Amitai Etzioni (2004: 1), ‘[t]he Commission is composed of national representatives’. 
Observations reported in recent research, however, largely challenge such claims. This 
section shows that the Commission is certainly not a ‘hothouse’ for intergovernmentalism. 
Largely supporting pioneer studies on Commission officials (Egeberg 1996), Trondal (2012a) 
suggests that the Commission administration has remained fairly independent of influence 
from member-state governments. Studies show that both permanent and temporary 
officials in the Commission act fairly independently of member-state influence (e.g. Trondal 
2010). Commission officials, notably the seconded national experts, indicate a rather low 
degree of identification with their national governments and tend to enjoy infrequent 
contacts towards their ‘home administration’ (Murdoch and Trondal 2012). Parallel 
observations are made in the College of Commissioners, however, with emphasis on 
Commissioners’ (portfolio) role perceptions (Egeberg 2006). 
 
Faced with an increasing agenda overload, one supplementary strategy available to the 
Commission in addition to building in-house administrative capacities is to import a large 
number of external experts when preparing initiatives and drafting new legislation. The 
Commission often possesses sufficient internal knowledge to modulate proposals without 
the help of external expertise. What is equally important is information on how member-
states and important interest groups may react. For that reason the Commission is not only 
increasingly dependent upon external expertise but also on external help to assess the likely 
obstacles that lie ahead in terms of competing preferences represented by the member-
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states and societal interests. The Commission has therefore developed several techniques to 
import expert advice during the early stages of the policy-making process. Recent updated 
estimates count as many as 1,237 Commission expert committees (ECs) - unevenly 
distributed among Commission DGs (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008). Comparing the size of 
the Commission workforce and the expert committee system, Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2008: 
13) state that ‘[i]n fact, there is about one expert group per eight persons working as an 
official in the European Commission’. ECs exist primarily in the policy domains of the 
Commission and there are considerably fewer expert groups in the internal services – such 
as the General Secretariat. Essential for our argument, ECs tend in practice to strengthen the 
administrative capacities of most policy DGs for two main reasons. Firstly, ECs are typically 
subordinated directly under single DGs. Most committees report to their parent DG only and 
seldom to other DGs. Secondly, most ECs are single-task entities largely mirroring the 
portfolio organisation of the DGs (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008). 
 
In addition to invite additional capacities through ECs, the Commission has in practice also 
EU agencies and networks of independent national agencies at its disposal. First, EU agencies 
may supply the Commission with relevant administrative and executive capacity. Due to 
their growing numbers, ‘agencification’ is a well-known phenomenon within Europe’s 
national executives (Christensen and Lægreid 2011; Pollitt et al. 2004; Wettenhall 2005). The 
‘agency fever’ at the EU level has been accelerating more recently (Dehousse 2008; Kelemen 
2002). Since the early 1990s more than 40 EU agencies have been created. Several of the 
currently existing agencies are granted some amount of formal decision-making power, 
while the remaining agencies have tasks such as information gathering, technical support 
and administration (Groenleer 2009). Most EU agencies have restricted de jure powers, 
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particularly with regard to making decisions. In addition to EU agencies, networks of national 
independent agencies have mushroomed, particularly with a role in facilitating the 
implementation of EU regulation (Eberlein and Grande 2005; Thatcher and Coen 2008). 
These networks have developed largely on the basis of pre-existing bodies and contributed 
to the accumulation and layering of administrative structures that facilitate the 
implementation of EU regulation. 
 
The mushrooming of EU agencies and administrative networks has occurred in parallel with 
expansion of the Commission services. The most recent boom of parallel ‘executive’ bodies 
at EU-level (outside the Commission and the Union Council) thus does not seem to have put 
the Commission’s expansion on a halt (Egeberg et al. 2012). In sum, both the Commission 
and EU-level agencies have acquired increased administrative capacity during recent years, 
partly due to a general strengthening of supranational executive powers, but also due to 
subsequent enlargements. Today, the Commission officially states that EU-level agencies 
have become an ‘important part of the EU’s institutional machinery’ (Commission 2008: 2).  
 
Finally, even the EP administration is shown to supply the Commission with relevant 
administrative resources. Since the EP was established there has been a dramatic growth in 
its General Secretariat. According to Corbett et al. (2011: 219) the number of posts increased 
from 37 in 1952 , almost 2000 in 1979, nearly 3000 posts by 1984, to the around 6000 
officials currently working for the EP. The expansion of the EP administration has come in 
the wake of increase in the number Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (from 78 
to 785), nationalities (six to 27) and working languages (four to 23), as well as the major task 
expansion of the EP. The EP’s administrative support structure is mainly organised in three 
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parts. 1) The General Secretariat 2) the staff of the EP’s political groups, and 3) the MEPs’ 
personal assistants. In a recent study, Egeberg et al. (2011) show that EP officials have a 
multiplicity of contacts as part of their daily work. However, the most important contact 
point reported is the Commission. EP officials also tend to emphasis most strongly 
arguments from the Commission, next to those from the Council. Thus, the Commission 
seems to be the key interlocutor also for the EP administration. In sum, therefore, the 
Commission has gained profound auxiliary organisational capacities at its disposal in addition 
to its increased in-house capacity. 
 
Integration 
Empirically it is often observed that the rise of common administrative space do not result in 
coherent systems consisting of perfectly-integrated and monolithic institutions. 
Administrative spaces do not typically ‘hang together’, exhibiting coherence and consistency. 
Instead, different components of administrative centres are observed to overlap, counteract, 
layer and sometimes be out of synch rather than being integrated, co-ordinated and 
‘ordered’ (Orren and Skowronek 2004). Compound administrative spaces are typically 
characterised by the co-existence of multiple and co-evolving decision-making and 
accountability dynamics.  
 
Supplementing the vertical specialisation of administrative systems, the internal integration 
of administrative systems is also increasingly documented within national governments - 
notably enhancing the role of Prime Ministers’ and Presidential Offices (Poguntke and Webb 
2005) – thus reasserting centres of executive government (Christensen and Lægreid 2011; 
Peters 2004). Similarly, one strand of contemporary research suggests that the Commission 
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has become increasingly integrated. Bureaucratic integration is observed both as regards 
intra-service decision-making processes inside the Commission as well as regards the 
Commission’s relationship towards outside actors – such as international organisations, EU 
agencies, and domestic governments (Kassim 2006; 2009; Trondal 2010). The history of the 
Commission documents periods of internal integration. Best known, perhaps, is the legacy of 
the Delors Commission (1985-94), characterised by presidential steering and a relative 
disregard of administrative routines (Christiansen 2008: 63; Kassim 2006). “At the end of 
Delors’ ten-year tenure at the helm of the Commission its potential for political leadership … 
had been demonstrated conclusively” (Christiansen 2008: 63). Essentially, however, the 
power-base of these presidents and their policy initiatives were often not safeguarded 
through bureaucratic capacity building within the Commission. A relative downgrading of 
bureaucratic organisation was also observed throughout the Monnet Presidency decades 
earlier. However, the power base of previous Commission Presidents such as Monnet and 
Delors was largely based on their personal capacities. Contemporary internal integration of 
the Commission is centred on building organisational capacities around the President, partly 
by reforming the Secretariat General (SG) into an administrative service centre at the 
disposal for the President.    
 
A second strand of recent research, however, highlights that presidentialisation of the 
Commission merely supplements the inherent horizontal specialisation and ‘silo-isation’ of 
the services (e.g. Trondal 2012b). A recent study suggests limitations to internal cohesion of 
the Commission services (Trondal 2012b). Integrative ambitions of the Commission President 
and the SG sometimes exceed their integrative capacities. The horizontal interlocking role of 
the SG tends to collide with the organisational resources embedded in the policy DGs. 
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Administrative integration of the Commission seems in practice sometimes to become 
dashed by the horizontal specialisation of the DGs. ‘Silo thinking’ is largely organisationally 
vested within the Commission services. Studies reveal that contact patterns among 
Commission officials within policy DGs are strongly driven by their portfolios (Trondal 
2012b). Recent research also confirm that informal networks among Commission officials is 
guided by the horizontal specialisation of the Commission administration, thus largely 
clustered within DGs and thus supporting the ‘silo logic’ reported above (Peterson 2011; 
Suvarierol 2007: 118). Moreover, patterns of co-operation and conflict inside the 
Commission administration are associated with the formal organisational boundaries of the 
services. Trondal (2012b) also reports that this effect is sustained and strengthened by the 
compulsory staff rotation system inside the Commission – emphasising intra-service rotation 
of personnel. Finally, Commission officials mainly direct their identities towards the DGs and 
only secondary towards the unit level and the Commission as a whole (Trondal 2012b). 
 
In sum, research suggests that internal integration of the Commission does not seem to 
profoundly penetrate the services. Reflecting the Neo-Weberian model outlined by Ongario 
(2010), two behavioural logics tend to co-exist within the Commission administration, albeit 
embedded and layered within different organisational sub-units. A portfolio logic seems to 
be overwhelmingly present within policy DGs. The portfolio logic serves as the foundational 
dynamic at the heart of policy DGs and it seems to be activated fairly independently of 
bureaucratic integration at the helm of the Commission. This observation echoes images of 
the Commission administration as fragmented with weak capacities for hierarchical steering, 
accompanying inter-service ‘turf wars’ that is marginally compensated by presidential 
control and administrative integration (e.g. Coombes 1970; Egeberg 1996; Page 1997; 
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Spinelli 1966). The Commission has been pictured as organisationally segmented (Hooghe 
1997; Page 1997: 135) and with an alleged ‘management deficit’ (Metcalfe 1992; Levy 2006). 
Hussein and Peterson (2011), however, suggest that this inherent logic of portfolio is 
increasingly challenged by bureaucratic integration, mainly forged by the Commission SG.  
 
These findings hold both when comparing permanent and temporary Commission officials 
(Trondal et al. 2008), and when ‘controlling for’ recent managerial reforms inside the 
Commission (e.g. Kassim 2009). Recent administrative reforms of the Commission have been 
described as historic, profound in depth, and wide-ranging in scope (Barzelay and Jacobsen 
2009; Bauer 2009; Schön-Quinlivan 2006). Yet, the behavioural logics among Commission 
officials seem not profoundly transformed by these reforms (Trondal 2012b). By contrast, 
the two behavioural logics reported above seem to be mainly guided by the organisational 
specialisation of the Commission services and the accumulation of relevant administrative 
capacities inside the Commission. 
 
Co-optation 
The independence and integration of the Commission has not only implications for how 
Commission officials act and think. The emergence of independent and integrated European 
administrative capacities also increases its ability to co-opt administrative sub-centres by 
stealth – notably EU-level agencies and domestic agencies, but probably also agencies within 
other international organisations thus reaching into global administrative architectures. 
 
Studies suggest that the inherent portfolio logic within the Commission services has certain 
effects on its ability to co-opt administrative sub-units. This is reflected in the development 
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of direct links between Commissioners and ‘their’ EU agencies (Groenleer 2009: 130). A 
recent study confirms that the pivotal role of the Commission in the daily life of EU agencies 
is evident within policy areas in which the Commission itself disposes over considerable 
organisational resources (Egeberg and Trondal 2011). This study also shows that in the policy 
formulation phase, the ‘parent’ Commission DG is seen by EU agency officials as particularly 
influential. At the policy implementation stage, by contrast, influence is tilted relatively 
towards one’s own agency and national agencies, although the Commission is considered to 
be the most powerful institution outside one’s own agency also at this stage (Egeberg and 
Trondal 2011). The Commission thus stands out as more pivotal in the daily life of EU 
agencies and therefore supplier of administrative capacities for the Commission. The pivotal 
role of the Commission in the daily life of EU agencies becomes even more evident within 
policy areas in which the Commission itself disposes over considerable organisational 
resources.  
 
Secondly, the portfolio organisation of the Commission is also reflected in the relationships 
that have evolved between the Commission and domestic agencies. Also domestic agencies 
seem to supply the Commission with relevant administrative capacities, particularly in the 
application of EU regulations. Studies show that implementation is multi-dimensional with 
several sources of power represented more or less simultaneously. Even the daily practicing 
of EU legislation at the national level is no longer solely in the hands of national 
governments although the role of ministerial departments is pivotal. Egeberg and Trondal 
(2009) show that national agency officials who report that the Commission is important as 
regards their implementation practices also tend to have direct contacts with the 
Commission. This study indicates that the Commission actively takes part in the practicing of 
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EU legislation at the national level. In short, the Commission seems to co-opt domestic 
agencies. Domestic agencies may thus supply the Commission with relevant administrative 
capacities, however, particularly at the implementation stage of the decision-making cycle. 
 
Institutionalisation 
The final dimension of development of EAS is the institutionalisation of this administrative 
arrangement. The idea of institutionalisation implies creating stability and regularity within 
structures, so that patterns of behaviour become predictable and uncontested. Given the 
legalistic nature of administration within the EU and EAS, there is an inherent institutional 
structure for administration. The integrated characteristic of EAS discussed above reflects 
some aspects of this institutionalisation. Two caveats are, however, needed. First, 
institutionalisation tends to take time, and it may thus be premature to assess 
institutionalisation of EAS and many of its new institutional innovations. Secondly, 
institutionalisation is hard to measure and thus difficult to assess. Nevertheless, 
institutionalisation remains an essential analytical dimension of EAS.  
 
In addition to the structural aspects of the EAS there is also a normative, ideational element 
involved. As Selznick (1957) has argued, institutionalisation involves infusing a structure with 
values greater than necessary for the mechanical achievement of their tasks. In terms of the 
EAS this normative basis of institutionalisation implies that there is some commitment to the 
Union and to the maintenance of existing patterns of governance within. In other words, 
maintenance of the existing administrative arrangements means something to the 
participants. This ideational basis of institutionalisation of EAS can be seen as having certain 
discursive and semantic elements. The need to transpose European directives into national 
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law requires acceptance of some common standards of administration, and of administrative 
law (Hofmann and Turk 2006). Thus, institutionalisation may accompany the rise of shared 
language for understanding administration within the EU becoming standard language for 
public administration in member-states, despite the broad differences in their administrative 
traditions (see Painter and Peters 2010). This shifting of language and law also reflects the 
cooptive processes described above.   
 
As well as the institutionalisation of the language and formats for public administration 
within EAS the structural elements of administration and governance may also be 
institutionalised. This approach to institutionalisation may be conceptualised more in terms 
of the efficiency gains available from EAS and the reduction of transaction costs. Just as the 
creation of the Euro has been justified as a means of reducing transaction costs within the 
European economy, the institutionalisation of EAS can be seen as reducing administrative 
costs across the Union. This institutionalisation has been true for some time for the central 
administrative organs in the Commission but also the “Eurocracy” of EU agencies and other 
ancillary organisations of the EU (Busuioc et al. 2012; Kelemen 2002). In these cases the 
institutionalisation involves the creation of common administrative capacities that extend 
beyond the remit of the Commission. EU agencies have created common regulatory 
standards as well as common administrative patterns in different policy areas, thus 
institutionalising a broader administrative space. 
 
The final point about the institutionalisation within EAS is that much of the decision-making 
practice has remained stable for some years. As pointed out above, despite some apparent 
major administrative changes in the Commission administration in the post-2000 period, the 
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basic behavioural orientations of the staff within this administrative system have remained 
largely stabile (Trondal 2012b). Thus, it would appear that the normative and behavioural 
patterns have been institutionalised sufficiently to resist profound change. 
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of EAS mirrors the development of all the institutions of the EU. The four 
dimensions of EAS outlined here help to understand the nature of this construct and its 
impact on the performance of the EU and the constituent states. It is important to note here 
that the EAS is indeed a construct that is difficult to identify in any clear and tangible form 
but yet does influence the behaviour of individual administrators and organisations. This 
construct does help us to understand the influences of membership in the Union have on 
the practices and the ideas of administrators within the member-states and the Union itself.  
It helps to demonstrate the existence of pervasive influences of EAS on the members and 
demonstrates the importance of ideas and discourses in shaping administrative action.  
 
This research agenda paper has suggested that EAS features a transformation of 
administrative order that can analytically be grasped in terms of institutional independence, 
integration, co-optation and institutionalisation. Taken together, these elements suggest 
that EAS may be understood as a compound and differentiated system of institutions, 
decision-making processes, behavioural patterns, and values. These elements suggest that 
EAS features the transformation of the inherent administrative order and the rise of an 
emergent common administrative system. Compound administrative spaces such as EAS are 
characterised by the co-existence of multiple and co-evolving institutions, decision-making 
dynamics and accountability practices. In compound administrative spaces, decision-making 
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dynamics are likely to co-exist but the mix may change over time as well as between 
different institutional contexts. The everyday world of EAS is determined by how trade-offs 
between decision-making and accountability dynamics are accommodated by actors in 
everyday decision making processes as well as in periods of institutional creation, 
reformation and dismantling. During periods of stress and uncertainty, as witnessed in 
Europe at present, existing balances in EAS as regards institutional independence, 
integration, co-optation and institutionalisation may change. Periods of change often 
accompany calls for reform (Coen and Roberts 2012), through which key elements of EAS 
may become subject to debate.   
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